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I. INTRODUCTION 
Section 3 of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment allows for a President to 
voluntarily transfer the power of his office to the Vice President during pe-
riods of presidential inability.1 Section 4 of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment 
allows for the Vice President and a majority of the cabinet to involuntarily 
remove the President if he is incapable or unwilling to acknowledge that he 
is unable to discharge the powers of his office.2 With the recent election of 
President Donald J. Trump, there have been increased discussions about the 
protections of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment and how they could be used to 
check President Trump in the event that he becomes mentally unstable or 
otherwise becomes unable to manage the affairs of the executive branch.3 
However, many of these discussions neglect to examine the inherent weak-
nesses of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment.4 Conversely, other commentators 
acknowledge the inherent weaknesses of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment but 
propose unrealistic or dangerous modifications to the existing legal frame-
work.5 
 
 1. U.S. CONST. amend. XXV, § 3. 
 2. U.S. CONST. amend. XXV, § 4. 
 3. Ross Douthat, The 25th Amendment Solution for Removing Trump, N.Y. TIMES 
(May 16, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/16/opinion/25th-amendment-trump.html; 
Richard A. Friedman, Is It Time to Call Trump Mentally Ill?, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 17, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/17/opinion/is-it-time-to-call-trump-mentally-ill.html; 
Heather Digby Parton, Don’t Look Now: It’s President Pence! Donald Trump Can Be De-
posed, Even Without Impeachment, SALON (Jan. 25, 2017), https://www.salon.com/
2017/01/25/dont-look-now-its-president-pence-donald-trump-can-be-deposed-even-without-
impeachment/; Dean Falvy, You’re Fired: Four Ways Donald Trump’s Presidency Might Not 
Last Four Years, JUSTIA (Feb. 2, 2017), https://verdict.justia.com/2017/02/02/youre-fired-
four-ways-donald-trumps-presidency-might-not-last-four-years. 
 4. For example, consider the following scenario: it is early September of 2020 and 
President Donald J. Trump, along with Vice President Mike Pence and the rest of the Cabi-
net, are in the midst of a scorched earth presidential campaign to win a second term in the 
White House. Further, during this tight reelection campaign and daily global turmoil, Presi-
dent Trump complains of numbness in his right arm and blurry vision during a private meet-
ing with Vice President Pence, Secretary Ben Carson, and Ivanka Trump. Mr. Pence and Dr. 
Carson soon begin noticing that the President is having frequent difficulty expressing himself 
verbally, recalling recent events, and staying focused on simple tasks. They also begin notic-
ing that Ivanka Trump is limiting their access to the President and is performing most of his 
official duties on his behalf. Vice President Pence and the rest of the cabinet now have a 
decision to make: do they reveal the underlying medical condition of the President and exer-
cise the involuntary protections of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment against President Trump, or 
do they remain silent? Exercising the involuntary provisions of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment 
would almost certainly cause the President to lose his reelection bid. However, if President 
Trump continues to serve, he may put the country at grave risk due to his illness. 
 5. See, e.g., Earl Blumenauer, The Fatal Flaw of the 25th Amendment, OREGONIAN 
(Feb. 15, 2017), http://www.oregonlive.com/opinion/index.ssf/2017/02/the_fatal_flaw_of_the
_25th_ame.html. 
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This article will therefore examine the shortcomings of the Twenty-
Fifth Amendment and how to improve this amendment responsibly within 
the existing legal framework. Part II of this article will detail the legal 
framework of presidential disability law prior to the adoption of the Twenty-
Fifth Amendment, the eventual passage of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, 
and the actual legal framework of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment.6 Part III 
will critique the Twenty-Fifth Amendment and discuss possible solutions to 
modify and strengthen the Twenty-Fifth Amendment within the existing 
legal framework.7 This section will also consider and reject various pro-
posals to replace the Twenty-Fifth Amendment. Part IV will offer various 
ways to strengthen the protections of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment within 
the existing constitutional framework.8 Part V will conclude that, although 
there is room for improvement, the Twenty-Fifth Amendment still offers the 
best way to prevent presidential disability.9 
II. BACKGROUND 
Although the Twenty-Fifth Amendment has recently come into vogue, 
the history of presidential inability and the legal frameworks seeking to 
remedy its effects is as old as the presidency itself.10 Part A will discuss the 
legal framework prior to the adoption of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment. Part 
B will discuss the passage of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment. Part C will ex-
amine the legal framework of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment. 
A. The Prior Legal Framework  
The legal framework managing presidential inability prior to the Twen-
ty-Fifth Amendment consisted of Article II, Section 1 of the Constitution, 
various order of succession laws, and, to a lesser extent, the Twentieth 
Amendment. However, as discussed below, the Constitution was ambiguous 
about key provisions, and the order of succession has changed multiple 
times to reflect different policy goals. 
 
 6. See infra Part II. 
 7. See infra Part III. 
 8. See infra Part IV. 
 9. See infra Part V. 
 10. Charles Witt, The Health and Controversial Death of George Washington, 80 EAR, 
NOSE AND THROAT J. 102, 104 (2001) (detailing the medical issues plaguing President George 
Washington). 
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1. Article II, Section 1, Clause 6 
The Founding Fathers originally provided for the possible death or in-
capacity of the President of the United States in Article II, Section 1 of the 
Constitution.11 This provision states that: 
In Case of the Removal of the President from Office, or of his Death, 
Resignation, or Inability to discharge the Powers and Duties of the said 
Office, the Same shall devolve on the Vice President, and the Congress 
may by Law provide for the Case of Removal, Death, Resignation or In-
ability, both of the President and Vice President, declaring what Officer 
shall then act as President, and such Officer shall act accordingly, until 
the Disability be removed, or a President shall be elected.12 
a. Presidential inability 
During the Constitutional Convention, Delaware delegate John Dickin-
son asked “what is the extent of the term ‘disability’ and who is to be the 
judge of it?”13 Unfortunately, Dickinson’s question would never be an-
swered during the Convention or in the Constitution.14 Thus, it should come 
as no surprise that this clause has been subject to much debate concerning 
(1) what is inability and (2) who determines when inability exists.15 None-
theless, the prevailing historical view of most presidential administrations 
and academics was that the Vice President determines the inability of the 
President.16 
b. Death of a President: The Tyler precedent 
Another ambiguity in Article II, Section 1, Clause 6 is whether the vice 
president, upon the death, incapacity, resignation, or impeachment of the 
President, assumes the presidency or merely serves as the acting President 
until the next election.17 The text of the provision only states that “[i]n Case 
of the Removal of the President from Office, or of his Death, Resignation, 
or Inability to discharge the Powers and Duties of the said Office, the Same 
 
 11. U.S. CONST. ART. II, § 1, cl. 6. 
 12. Id.; see also Peter Frelinghuysen, Jr., Presidential Disability, 307 ANNALS AM. 
ACAD. 144, 144–46 (1956). 
 13. JAMES M. RONAN, LIVING DANGEROUSLY: THE UNCERTAINTIES OF PRESIDENTIAL 
DISABILITY AND SUCCESSION 1 (2015). 
 14. See id. at 1–3. 
 15. Id. at 1. 
 16. See John D. Feerick, Presidential Succession and Inability: Before and After the 
Twenty-Fifth Amendment, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 907, 912–13 (2010). 
 17. Id. at 918–19. 
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shall devolve on the Vice President.”18 However, any ambiguity was essen-
tially put to rest by the decisive actions of Vice President John Tyler.19 
President William Henry Harrison, the ninth President of the United 
States, died of pneumonia on the early morning of April 4, 1841.20 Harrison 
was the first President to die in office, so the matter was not settled on 
whether the Vice President ascended to the presidency or merely served as 
acting President.21 Nonetheless, Vice President Tyler believed that Article II, 
Section I, combined with his taking of the presidential oath, entitled him to 
fully assume the presidency in his own right.22 Tyler acted out his belief by 
asserting his authority as President over the cabinet and his detractors.23 
Congress later passed a resolution recognizing John Tyler as the tenth Presi-
dent of the United States.24 This resolution, coupled with Tyler’s strong ac-
tions, set precedent for the Vice President assuming the presidency follow-
ing the death, resignation, or impeachment of the President rather than mere-
ly serving as acting President.25 
c. Death of the President and Vice President: Order of succes-
sion laws 
Article II, Section 1, Clause 6 also provides for Congress to establish 
who, in the event that both the President and Vice President are impeached, 
resigned, or deceased, will serve as acting President.26 The acting President, 
however, will only serve until “the Disability be removed” or until a new 
President is elected.27 Fortunately, throughout the history of the United 
States, the succession laws have not been put to the test.28 
 
 18. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 6. 
 19. Leonard Dinnerstein, The Accession of John Tyler to the Presidency, 70 VA. MAG. 
HIST. AND BIOGRAPHY 448, 449 (1962). 
 20. JOHN R. BUMGARNER, THE HEALTH OF THE PRESIDENTS: THE 41 UNITED STATES 
PRESIDENTS THROUGH 1993 FROM A PHYSICIAN’S POINT OF VIEW 59, 62 (1994); see also 
EDWARD P. CRAPOL, JOHN TYLER: THE ACCIDENTAL PRESIDENT 7–10 (2006). 
 21. CRAPOL, supra note 20, at 7–10. 
 22. RONAN, supra note 13, at 12–13; Dinnerstein, supra note 19, at 449. 
 23. See RONAN, supra note 13, at 12–15. 
 24. Id. at 15. 
 25. Id.; see also Joel K. Goldstein, History and Constitutional Interpretation: Some 
Lessons from the Vice Presidency, 69 ARK. L. REV. 647, 689 (2016) (“Public servants often 
invoke prior practice to justify behavior. Seven Vice Presidents who succeeded to the presi-
dency in the nineteenth and twentieth century relied on the Tyler Precedent to justify their 
claims. In fact, the practice quickly won such acceptance that no citation was needed.”). 
 26. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 6. 
 27. Id. 
 28. RONAN, supra note 13, at 7–9, 23–25, 34–35. 
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The first order of succession law was The Presidential Succession Act 
of 1792.29 This law provided that, should both the Office of the President 
and Vice President be vacant due to death, resignation, or removal from 
office, the President Pro Tempore of the Senate would serve as Acting Pres-
ident of the United States.30 If the office of the Senate Pro Tempore of the 
Senate were vacant, the Speaker of the House of Representatives would 
serve as Acting President of the United States.31 The law also required that a 
special election be held to elect a new President.32 
The second order of succession law was the Presidential Succession 
Act of 1886.33 This law removed both the President Pro Tempore of the 
Senate and the Speaker of the House from the order of succession and re-
placed them with members of the cabinet.34 The order of succession within 
the cabinet was based on seniority of when the cabinet department was cre-
ated.35 This law did not require a special election to elect a new President.36 
The modern law is the Presidential Succession Act of 1947.37 This law, 
assuming the President and Vice President are deceased, resigned, or im-
peached, makes the Speaker of the House the first in the order of succes-
sion.38 The President Pro Tempore of the Senate is next in the line of succes-
sion, followed by members of the cabinet based on seniority of when their 
departments were established.39 Although this law has never been used, its 
constitutionality has been questioned.40 
2. The Twentieth Amendment 
The Twentieth Amendment, which was ratified in 1933, moved the be-
ginning of the presidential term from March 4th to January 20th.41 The 
Amendment also provided that if the President-Elect dies in-between elec-
tion day and inauguration day, the Vice President-Elect is to be sworn in as 
 
 29. Id. at 7. 
 30. Act of Mar. 1, 1792, ch. 8, § 9, 1 Stat. 239, 240 (repealed 1886). 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. § 10. 
 33. RONAN, supra note 13, at 23. 
 34. Charles S. Hamlin, The Presidential Succession Act of 1886, 18 HARV. L. REV. 182, 
182–83 (1905). 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. 
 37. 3 U.S.C. § 19 (2006); see RONAN, supra note 13, at 34. 
 38. 3 U.S.C. § 19(a)(1). 
 39. Id. § 19(b), (d). 
 40. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar & Vikram David Amar, Is the Presidential Succession 
Law Constitutional?, 48 STAN. L. REV. 113, 113–16 (1995). 
 41. U.S. CONST. amend. XX, § 1. 
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President.42 The Amendment also provides for additional guidelines to be 
written by Congress if necessary.43 
B. The Passage of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment 
Although there had been attempts at reform in the past following vari-
ous periods of presidential inability, the periods of inability suffered by 
President Eisenhower and President Johnson and the death of President 
Kennedy would serve as the necessary catalyst for the passage of the Twen-
ty-Fifth Amendment.44 On September 24, 1955, President Dwight E. Eisen-
hower suffered a heart attack during the middle of the night during a trip in 
Denver, Colorado.45 Although the condition was originally downplayed by 
the administration, Eisenhower insisted that the public be made fully aware 
of his medical condition.46 Eisenhower was expected to fully recover from 
his heart attack but required complete rest for a month.47 During this rest, the 
Cabinet carried out the status quo of government.48 Moreover, Governor 
Sherman Adams of Colorado would serve as the official spokesman of the 
President rather than Vice President Nixon.49 During this time, the executive 
branch was dysfunctional, and it was often unclear whether a bedridden 
President Eisenhower, Vice President Nixon, or Governor Adams was in 
charge of the federal government.50 
Another shortcoming of the current legal system was highlighted on 
June 8, 1956 when President Eisenhower was taken to the hospital for the 
removal of an obstruction in his small intestine.51 While in surgery, which 
lasted two hours, the President was unconscious.52 It was unclear during 
those two hours who, if anyone, would have legal authority to act if an 
emergency arose during that time.53 
 
 42. Id. § 3; see also Akhil Reed Amar, Presidents, Vice Presidents, and Death: Closing 
the Constitution’s Succession Gap, 48 ARK. L. REV. 215, 216 (1995). 
 43. See RONAN, supra note 13, at 31–32. 
 44. Id. at 71–72; see Herbert Brownell, Jr., Presidential Disability: The Need for a Con-
stitutional Amendment, 68 Yale L. J. 189, 210–211 (1958); see also Ruth C. Silva, Presiden-
tial Succession and Disability, 21 L. AND CONTEMP. PROBS. 646, 660–62 (1956). 
 45. JOHN D. FEERICK, FROM FAILING HANDS: THE STORY OF PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION 
213–14 (1965). 
 46. Id. at 214–16. 
 47. Id. at 215. 
 48. JOHN D. FEERICK THE TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT: ITS COMPLETE HISTORY AND 
APPLICATIONS 19 (3rd ed. 2014). 
 49. Id. 
 50. See id. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
 53. See id. 
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Because of Eisenhower’s health conditions and the continued legal un-
certainty as to who is President during times of incapacity, Eisenhower be-
gan speaking with Vice President Nixon, the cabinet, and the Department of 
Justice to study the problem of presidential disability and succession.54 The 
Attorney General could not reach a conclusion on what procedure should be 
followed if the President were unable to declare his own incapacity.55 Eisen-
hower wanted the law changed so that a President could declare his own 
incapacity or, in the event that the President could not declare his own inca-
pacity, a panel of medical experts and the Chief Justice of the Supreme 
Court could make that determination.56 Several cabinet members, however, 
preferred that the Vice President make the determination of presidential in-
capacity, with checks and balances provided by the cabinet.57 This latter idea 
was proposed by the Eisenhower administration to Congress as a constitu-
tional amendment.58 However, the amendment failed for partisan reasons 
because Democrats feared this was a way to install Nixon as President prior 
to the election.59 
Since the constitutional amendment failed, Eisenhower and Nixon en-
tered into an informal agreement to manage presidential incapacity.60 The 
agreement provided that the Vice President would serve as acting President 
if the President stated that he was incapacitated or would be incapacitated.61 
In the event that the President could not declare his incapacity, the Vice 
President would make that determination after appropriate consultation.62 
However, in either event, the President could determine at any time when 
his incapacity had ended and would then resume the full powers of his of-
fice.63 
This agreement represented the first significant step towards addressing 
the problem of presidential incapacity.64 However, this agreement was pure-
ly voluntary and did not have the force of law. Moreover, a President who is 
clearly incapacitated from a legal standpoint may still retain the physical 
ability to declare that his incapacity has ended. Fortunately, despite Eisen-
hower’s medical conditions, the agreement was never put to the test and 
Eisenhower continued his administration without further incident.65 Future 
 
 54. FEERICK, supra note 48, at 23. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. at 24. 
 60. FREERICK, supra note 48, at 53. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. at 54. 
 64. Id. 
 65. See id. 
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administrations would borrow the agreement that Eisenhower and Nixon 
established.66 
On November 22, 1963 at approximately 12:30 p.m., President Kenne-
dy was assassinated as his motorcade drove through Dallas, Texas.67 Presi-
dent Kennedy was rushed to the hospital but was pronounced dead at 1:00 
p.m.68 Vice President Lyndon B. Johnson took the oath of office at 2:38 p.m. 
and assumed the presidency.69 
The line of presidential succession was especially vulnerable during 
this dangerous time in American history.70 When Lyndon Johnson assumed 
the presidency at age 55, he already had known, serious medical issues, in-
cluding heart complications.71 Additionally, Speaker of the House John 
McCormack was 71 years old and Senate Pro Tempore Carl Hayden was 86 
years old.72 Finally, at this time in history, there was no way for the Presi-
dent to name a replacement Vice President.73 
Despite his relatively poor health, President Johnson had only minor 
periods of incapacity in the White House.74 In October of 1965, President 
Johnson had his gall bladder removed.75 Before going under anesthesia, 
President Johnson voluntarily transferred the powers of the presidency to 
Vice President Hubert Humphrey under the terms of their informal agree-
ment, making Humphrey the acting President.76 After recovering from the 
effects of the anesthesia, President Johnson resumed the powers of the pres-
idency pursuant to their agreement.77 Although the legality of this transfer 
could be questioned, as a matter of policy it was a wise decision and helped 
pave the way for the Twenty-Fifth Amendment.78 
 
 66. FEERICK, supra note 48, at 54. 
 67. JOSIAH THOMPSON, SIX SECONDS IN DALLAS: A MICRO-STUDY OF THE KENNEDY 
ASSASSINATION 196–213 (1967). 
 68. November 22, 1963: Death of the President, JOHN F. KENNEDY PRESIDENTIAL LIB. 
AND MUSEUM, https://www.jfklibrary.org/JFK/JFK-in-History/November-22-1963-Death-of-
the-President.aspx (last visited Apr. 15, 2018). 
 69. Id; see also Julia L. Ernst, John F. Kennedy and Constitutional Aspects of Presiden-
tial Succession, 76 U. PITT. L. REV. 63, 64 (2004). 
 70. See Ernst, supra note 69, at 64. 
 71. How JFK’s Assassination Led to a Constitutional Amendment, NAT’L CONST. CTR. 
(Nov. 22, 2016), http://blog.constitutioncenter.org/2016/11/how-jfks-assassination-led-to-a-
constitutional-amendment/. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. 
 74. James M. Young, M.D., Presidential Illness and the Twenty-Fifth Amendment: A 
Former White House Physician’s Perspective, in MANAGING CRISIS: PRESIDENTIAL 
DISABILITY AND THE TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT 74–75 (Robert E. Gilbert ed., 2000). 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. 
 78. See id. 
10 UA LITTLE ROCK LAW REVIEW [Vol. 40 
On January 6, 1965, in response to the death of President Kennedy and 
this recent history of presidential inability, Senator Birch Bayh of Indiana 
proposed S. J. Res. 1 in the Senate.79 An identical resolution was introduced 
in the House by Congressman Emanuel Celler, who was the Chairman of the 
House Judiciary Committee.80 The Senate passed Senator Bayh’s resolution 
on February 19, 1965 and the House passed an amended version of S. J. 
Res. 1 on April 22, 1965.81 The differences between the House and Senate 
versions were relatively minor.82 A Conference Committee was appointed to 
resolve the differences between the House and Senate versions of the 
amendment.83 The final version of the proposal, which would later become 
the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, was approved by the House on June 30, 1965 
and then by the Senate on July 6, 1965.84 This proposal was ratified by the 
necessary number of state legislatures on February 10, 1967, thereby be-
coming the Twenty-Fifth Amendment.85 
C. The Legal Framework of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment 
The Twenty-Fifth Amendment has four sections.86 The first codified 
the Tyler Precedent by stating that upon “the removal of the President by 
death or resignation, the Vice President shall become the President.”87 This 
provision made it explicitly clear as a matter of law that a Vice President 
who assumes the presidency because of the death or resignation of the Pres-
ident actually becomes the President rather than merely serving as an acting 
President. 
The second section allows the President to nominate a Vice President 
whenever the vice presidency is vacant.88 This nominee becomes the new 
Vice President upon confirmation by both the House and the Senate.89 This 
is important for situations where the Vice President has been removed from 
office or has died, or when the Vice President has ascended to the presiden-
cy. 
 
 79. FEERICK, supra note 48, at 79. 
 80. Id. at 79–80. 
 81. Id. at 99–100. 
 82. See id. at 100–01. 
 83. Id. at 100. 
 84. Id. at 101–04; see also BIRCH BAYH, ONE HEARTBEAT AWAY: PRESIDENTIAL 
DISABILITY AND SUCCESSION 305–33 (1968). 
 85. FEERICK, supra note 48, at 105. 
 86. See U.S. CONST. amend. XXV. 
 87. Id. § 1. 
 88. Id. § 2. 
 89. Id. 
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Section 3 allows for the President to transfer his power voluntarily to 
the Vice President when he is unable to fulfill his duties.90 The President 
must inform the President Pro Tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the 
House in writing that he is unable to fulfill the duties of his office.91 The 
Vice President then serves as acting President and has all the powers and 
duties of the President of the United States until the President informs the 
President Pro Tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House that he is 
able to resume his duties or until a new President is elected.92 This is similar 
to the informal agreement between President Eisenhower and Vice President 
Nixon, which was later adopted by President Kennedy and President John-
son.93 
Section 4 allows for the involuntary removal of the President when he 
is unable or unwilling to declare his inability.94 If the Vice President and a 
majority of the cabinet, or such other body as Congress may by law provide, 
vote that the President is unable to discharge his duties, and they convey this 
in writing to the President Pro Tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the 
House, then the Vice President immediately assumes the powers of the pres-
idency and serves as Acting President of the United States.95 The President, 
however, can revoke this by informing the Senate Pro Tempore of the Sen-
ate and the Speaker of the House in writing that no inability exists.96 The 
President then regains all of his powers and duties, and the Vice President is 
no longer the acting President.97 
If the President states that no inability exists, the cabinet and the Vice 
President have two options. First, they can do nothing and allow the Presi-
dent to regain his powers.98 Second, if within four days a majority of the 
cabinet, or such other body as Congress may by law provide, and the Vice 
President vote again that the President is still incapacitated, and they inform 
the President Pro Tempore and Speaker of the House that the President is 
still incapacitated, then the President does not regain the powers of his office 
and the Vice President continues to serve as Acting President of the United 
States.99 
 
 90. Id. § 3. 
 91. Id. 
 92. U.S. CONST. amend. XXV, § 3. 
 93. FEERICK, supra note 48, at 53; Stephen W. Stathis, Presidential Disability Agree-
ments Prior to the 25th Amendment, 12 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 208, 209–12 (1982). 
 94. U.S. CONST. amend. XXV, § 4; see also Akhil Reed Amar, Applications and Impli-
cations of the Twenty Fifth-Amendment, 47 HOUS. L. REV. 1, 2 (2010). 
 95. U.S. CONST. amend. XXV, § 4. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. 
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If this second option is used, Congress then must decide whether the 
President is incapacitated.100 Once assembled, Congress must decide within 
twenty-one days whether the President is incapacitated.101 If both chambers 
determine by a two-thirds vote that the President is unable to discharge the 
powers and duties of his office, then the Vice President continues to serve as 
Acting President of the United States until the disability is removed or the 
next President is elected.102 However, if Congress fails to act within the req-
uisite time period, or fails to reach the two-thirds requirement, the President 
resumes the powers and duties of his office.103 Nonetheless, there is nothing 
forbidding the cabinet and the Vice President from implementing this pro-
cess again.104 
III. ANALYSIS 
Although the Twenty-Fifth Amendment was a major improvement in 
preventing presidential inability, it is uncertain whether the Twenty-Fifth 
Amendment offers adequate protection against an incapacitated President 
continuing to serve in his official capacity. Part A offers a historical critique 
of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment by concluding that if history serves as a 
guide, the protections of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment are inadequate.105 
Part B offers possible solutions to modify or replace the Twenty-Fifth 
Amendment and their respective shortcomings.106 These solutions, broadly 
speaking, include passing a new constitutional amendment to replace the 
Twenty-Fifth Amendment or passing legislation within the existing constitu-
tional framework. Finally, Part C examines methods of reform that can oc-
cur outside of the legal system.107 
A. The Historical Critique of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment 
This nation has suffered serious difficulties with death, disability, and 
incapacity in the White House.108 However, a few key historical trends have 
occurred that bear special importance for the purposes of the Twenty-Fifth 
Amendment. These trends are (1) that Presidents conceal their inabilities 
from the public, (2) that Presidents conceal their inabilities from their ad-
 
 100. Id. 
 101. U.S. CONST. amend. XXV, § 4. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. 
 105. See infra Part III A. 
 106. See infra Part III B. 
 107. See infra Part III C. 
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ministration, (3) that Vice Presidents and the cabinet are ineffective during 
periods of presidential inability, (4) that the press can be an ineffective 
watchdog during periods of presidential incapacity, and (5) that Presidents 
can be reluctant to transfer power under Section 3 of the Twenty-Fifth 
Amendment. These historical trends demonstrate that the protections of the 
Twenty-Fifth Amendment are insufficient. 
1. Presidents Conceal Their Inabilities from the Public 
The first trend is that Presidents conceal their illnesses and disabilities 
from the public. The first example of concealment occurred during the pres-
idency of Grover Cleveland. President Cleveland, after being diagnosed 
with cancer in May of 1893, concealed his diagnosis from the public.109 
Making matters worse, Cleveland would undergo a secret surgery to remove 
the cancer while on aboard a private yacht.110 The President was strapped in 
a chair, given anesthesia, and the tumor was removed.111 This initial surgery 
was extremely risky due to the conditions of the surgery and the President’s 
poor health.112 
The most egregious example is Woodrow Wilson’s inability following 
his stroke.113 On October 2, 1919, Wilson suffered a massive stroke.114 He 
was first discovered by his wife, Edith Wilson, who immediately called for 
White House physician Dr. Grayson.115 Shortly thereafter, Dr. Dercum, a 
neurologist, diagnosed Wilson as suffering from a stroke and paralysis on 
the left side of his body.116 
Shortly after the diagnosis, Dr. Grayson and Dr. Dercum discussed the 
matter with Edith Wilson.117 Edith demanded that the doctors keep Wilson’s 
medical condition confidential because she believed that sharing this infor-
mation, which could result in his removal from office, would be detrimental 
to his recovery.118 The doctors acquiesced to her request and would issue a 
series of misleading statements to the press.119 The press largely took these 
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statements at face value and ran encouraging articles about the President’s 
improving health.120 
Franklin Roosevelt also concealed his ailments from the public. Presi-
dent Roosevelt, in addition to downplaying his polio caused paralysis 
throughout his entire political career, concealed his rapidly declining health 
from the public during his final presidential election.121 After being elected 
for a fourth term, Roosevelt’s condition continued to worsen; he was indeci-
sive, lethargic, lost weight, and his blood pressure rose.122 However, Roose-
velt, his doctors, and his advisors maintained to the public that he was in 
good health.123 
Kennedy also concealed multiple health issues from the public. At the 
age of 30 years old, Kennedy was diagnosed with Addison’s disease: a dis-
order caused by an insufficient amount of hormones, which can be managed 
by medication.124 Kennedy, who was a congressman at the time of his diag-
nosis, withheld this information from the public and blamed his symptoms 
on malaria.125 Later on, Kennedy would have a secret and dangerous opera-
tion to relieve his chronic back pain while he was a senator.126 This surgery 
was not known to the press or the general public until after his presidency 
had ended.127 Despite protracted rumors of his Addison’s disease during his 
presidential candidacy, Kennedy was able to put these rumors to rest by a 
series of misleading, although factually accurate, medical statements.128 
Despite overcoming the political consequences of his ailments, Presi-
dent Kennedy would never overcome their physical effects. During his pres-
idency, Kennedy would take a variety of powerful medications such as ster-
oids and cortisone for his Addison’s disease, antibiotics for urinary tract 
infections, anti-spasmodics for his colitis, and an anti-psychotic for a tempo-
rary mood swing.129 Kennedy would also receive testosterone on a daily 
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basis during his entire presidency.130 Kennedy was also given injections of 
painkillers and amphetamines into his back.131 This information did not 
come to light until years after his presidency had ended.132 
Thus, this history shows us that Presidents often put their own political 
interests ahead of being fully forthcoming with the public regarding their 
declining health. Moreover, as evidenced by the less than candid release of 
medical information by Hillary Clinton and Donald J. Trump during the 
most recent election cycle, we can expect for this trend of deception to con-
tinue.133 
2. President’s Conceal Their Illnesses and Disabilities from Their 
Administration 
Second, in addition to concealing their health issues from the public, 
many Presidents have concealed their health issues from their Vice Presi-
dent and cabinet. Once again, Wilson is the most extreme example: he kept 
his Vice President and a majority of his cabinet in the dark about the true 
extent of his disability.134 
However, Secretary of State Robert Lansing and a few members of the 
cabinet were informed confidentially about the full extent of Wilson’s disa-
bility.135 Because of his knowledge, Lansing suggested that the Vice Presi-
dent serve as acting President during this period of incapacity.136 On October 
6, 1919, Secretary of State Lansing called a cabinet meeting and argued that 
the Vice President should serve as acting President if Wilson was unable to 
discharge his duties.137 However, White House physician Dr. Grayson re-
fused to answer any questions and simply voiced Wilson’s supposed dis-
pleasure that a cabinet meeting had been called without his authority.138 This 
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ended Lansing’s desire to have the cabinet label Wilson as incapacitated.139 
Wilson would later dismiss Lansing as Secretary of State in February of 
1920 due to his perceived disloyalty.140 As a result, for the next year and a 
half, the United States would be without a fully functioning chief execu-
tive.141 
Likewise, President Cleveland did not reveal his cancer diagnosis or 
his plan to have a secret operation to his administration.142 Rather, only one 
member of the cabinet was aware of this plan.143 Fortunately, Cleveland was 
largely unaffected by the operation.144 
Finally, President Franklin Roosevelt kept Vice President Harry Tru-
man in the dark regarding his rapidly deteriorating health and did not in-
volve him in any areas of foreign policy.145 Truman was not even briefed on 
the development of atomic weapons.146 In fact, Truman had only spoken to 
Roosevelt twice since the inauguration, and even then, only about legislative 
matters.147 Despite the fact that Vice President Truman was not briefed on 
matters of foreign affairs and national security, he was still able to provide 
admirable leadership when he assumed the presidency.148 However, the fact 
that a President in rapidly declining health kept his Vice President ignorant 
of key matters of national security is a cause for concern and must serve as a 
reminder for modern Presidents. 
Due to the fact that Section 4 of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment is de-
pendent upon aggressive action by the Vice President and the cabinet, it is 
particularly distressing to see this long history of Presidents concealing their 
failing health from their cabinet and their Vice President. Moreover, now 
that the Twenty-Fifth Amendment empowers the Vice President and the 
cabinet to remove the President involuntarily during periods of incapacity, 
the incentive for Presidents to hide this damaging information has only in-
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creased. Only time will tell if this American tradition of presidential decep-
tion will continue. 
3. Vice Presidents and the Cabinet Are Ineffective During Presiden-
tial Incapacity 
Third, Vice Presidents and cabinet members are often paralyzed by in-
decision during periods of moderate to severe presidential inability, such as 
when the President is alive but is unable to govern.149 The first example was 
when President Garfield was incapacitated and Vice President Arthur re-
fused to take any action to replace the mortally wounded leader.150 On July 
2nd, 1881, at 9:20 a.m., President Garfield was shot by a disgruntled sup-
porter.151 Garfield would largely be incapacitated for 80 days until his 
death.152 As a result, foreign policy and the daily functioning of the execu-
tive branch essentially came to a halt.153 Garfield would not die until Sep-
tember 19, 1881.154 However, at no time during these 80 days of incapacity 
did Vice President Chester A. Arthur confer with the President or attempt to 
assume the duties of the presidency.155 Arthur was concerned about the ap-
pearances of seizing power, especially since they were from different fac-
tions of the Republican Party.156 
Again, the most damning example occurred during the Wilson admin-
istration when Vice President Thomas Marshall refused to take steps to re-
place Wilson despite his protracted disability.157 Despite calls to serve as 
acting President from Secretary Lansing, Vice President Marshall did not 
seek to become the acting President because he was afraid of angering Edith 
Wilson and appearing as a usurper of power.158 Likewise, with the exception 
of Lansing, the cabinet was largely ineffective during this period in trying to 
determine Wilson’s inability.159 
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As such, due to Marshall’s timidity and Lansing’s dismissal, Edith 
Wilson and Dr. Grayson essentially served as the de-facto President.160 They 
controlled what matters, if any, reached Wilson’s desk, and they controlled 
who would see the President.161 During this year-and-a-half period of disa-
bility, government vacancies went unfilled, twenty-eight bills became law 
because of presidential inaction, and America’s entrance into the League of 
Nations was defeated in the Senate.162 This unauthorized use of power and 
executive weakness could have been prevented if Vice President Marshall 
would have assumed his constitutional duty to manage the executive branch 
during this period of presidential inability. 
A surprising example of vice presidential timidity was Vice President 
Richard Nixon’s deferential approach during Eisenhower’s recovery.163 On 
September 24, 1955, President Dwight E. Eisenhower suffered a heart attack 
while in Colorado.164 While he was recovering, the cabinet carried out the 
status quo of government under an unofficial agreement.165 Additionally, 
Governor Sherman Adams of Colorado, rather than Vice President Nixon, 
served as the official spokesman of the President while he was resting in 
Colorado.166 
Not surprisingly, this system caused great confusion as it was often un-
clear to both the cabinet and the press whether Vice President Nixon, Gov-
ernor Adams, or an incapacitated Eisenhower was in charge of the federal 
government.167 To that end, Nixon was highly deferential during this period 
and did not sit in the President’s chair or office.168 The cabinet also began to 
act outside of their designated authority and soon began to realize the short-
comings of the current system for dealing with presidential disability.169 
Nixon would eventually come to believe that this committee system only 
worked due to the fact that there was not a national emergency or pressing 
issue which occurred during Eisenhower’s period of incapacity.170 However, 
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Nixon could have improved this situation by decisive executive leadership 
rather than letting the cabinet run amok and letting a state governor serve as 
the mouthpiece of the President of the United States.171 One should be con-
cerned that if Vice President Nixon was afraid of being seen as a usurper of 
executive power, the same could be true for other Vice Presidents. 
Admittedly, the above examples occurred prior to the Twenty-Fifth 
Amendment. Thus, one might argue that a modern Vice President and cabi-
net, who are strengthened by the constitutional provisions of the Twenty-
Fifth Amendment, would be much more decisive in the modern era. Howev-
er, that is not necessarily the case. 
For example, after President Ronald Reagan underwent anesthesia and 
surgery following an assassination attempt, Vice President George H.W. 
Bush was reluctant in exercising authority.172 At the time of the attempted 
assassination, Vice President George H.W. Bush was in Texas, although he 
immediately returned to the White House upon learning of the attack.173 Up-
on his return to Washington, Bush refused to take a Marine helicopter to the 
South Lawn of the White House because “[o]nly the [P]resident lands on the 
South Lawn.”174 Bush further noted that landing on the South Lawn “might 
well have made for great TV, but I thought it would have sent the wrong 
message to the country and to the world” and that “I was also thinking about 
Nancy Reagan, and how she probably didn’t need that kind of distraction at 
that time.”175 
Once at the White House, Bush would continue his hands-off approach 
to leadership.176 Bush would not use the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, either 
Section 3 or 4, during Reagan’s surgery or while he recovered from sur-
gery.177 Moreover, Bush did not assume any special powers or responsibili-
ties during Reagan’s recovery from the surgery.178 Rather, Bush would defer 
to or clear decisions with White House Chief of Staff James Baker, Counse-
lor to the President Edwards Meese, and White House Deputy Chief of Staff 
Michael Deaver.179 In fact, these three individuals effectively managed the 
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executive branch while the President recovered from his surgery for the next 
several weeks.180 Although Bush desired to appear deferential, he ultimately 
surrendered executive authority to unelected advisors who were not even 
confirmed by the Senate.181 
Likewise, the cabinet neglected its responsibility under Section 4 of the 
Twenty-Fifth Amendment during Reagan’s period of incapacity. While 
Bush was returning to the White House, Attorney General William Smith 
and White House Counsel Fred Fielding brought the paperwork to invoke 
Section 4 of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment to the situation room and ex-
plained the operation of the amendment to the President’s staff, advisors, 
and the cabinet.182 Richard Darman, an assistant to the President, argued that 
the subject matter was inappropriate and took away the documents and 
locked them away in his safe.183 This ended any discussion of invoking the 
involuntary protections of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, and the cabinet 
would not further consider its constitutional obligation to invoke the Twen-
ty-Fifth Amendment.184 It is particularly distressing that the cabinet let an 
assistant to the President sideline their constitutional obligation. 
The reasons for this timidity in the executive branch are numerous. For 
one, Vice Presidents are afraid of being seen as usurpers of power during 
times of tragedy. Although a respectful gesture, this is not the strong leader-
ship that the country needs during times of crisis. Rather, when in doubt, it 
would be preferable for the Vice President to err on the side of decisiveness 
during times of potential inability. If a power vacuum occurs in the execu-
tive branch, it is preferable that this vacuum is filled by the Vice President, 
who was elected by the people of the United States and has a constitutional 
responsibility to them, rather than having unelected cabinet members, presi-
dential advisors, or even family members filling the leadership void. 
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A related reason that Vice Presidents often justify their hands-off ap-
proach is out of respect for the first lady. This was evidenced during Wil-
son’s disability and by Vice President George H.W. Bush.185 From a matter 
of public policy and constitutional law, this justification, or perhaps an ex-
cuse, has absolutely no merit. 
Lastly, vice presidential candidates are often selected by a presidential 
candidate for political reasons, such as the electability of the presidential 
ticket or to unite various factions of their political party, rather than seeking 
a true partner in managing the nation.186 As such, once the President is elect-
ed, Vice Presidents are often relegated to a quasi-ceremonial position who 
have little actual power.187 Thus, Vice Presidents may often lack the political 
strength within the executive branch, the experience, or the independent 
authority to assert control persuasively during periods of incapacity. For this 
reason, presidential candidates should pick a vice presidential candidate 
with a demonstrated record of strong executive leadership or an individual 
accustomed to making difficult choices under stressful situations rather than 
a candidate who merely balances the ticket or unites the party. 
Likewise, cabinet officials are often picked for political reasons rather 
than for their independent strength. Moreover, as evidenced by Secretary of 
State Lansing during the Wilson administration, cabinet members can be 
dismissed by the President for any reason.188 The fear of being fired could 
lead cabinet members to be especially timid during periods of presidential 
inability. 
4. The Press Is an Ineffective Watchdog for Presidential Inability 
Fourth, the press is often an ineffective watchdog for presidential ina-
bility. During President Cleveland’s secret surgery, for example, the press 
was unable to persuasively determine what actually occurred until years 
after the surgery.189 During Wilson’s inability, the press largely believed the 
administration’s narrative that Wilson was not disabled.190 The press acqui-
esced in downplaying FDR’s physical limitations due to his polio caused 
paralysis and did not discover his failing health during an election year.191 
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Finally, the press was unable to discover Kennedy’s Addison’s diagnosis, 
his concoction of powerful medications, or his secret back surgery until well 
after his death.192 
However, it is worth noting that the press was aggressive in determin-
ing who was in control during President Reagan’s emergency operation.193 
Further, in the modern age of cable news and the internet, one may believe 
that situations like Wilson could not occur again. Likewise, due to the an-
tagonistic relationship between the press and President Trump, it is unlikely 
that any legitimate disability in the Trump administration could be hidden.194 
Although these arguments have merit, we must remember that the press is 
not infallible and that most journalists lack any sort of medical training. 
Moreover, in contrast to President Trump, future administrations may have 
very friendly relationships with the press. Thus, the possibility that the press 
will serve as an ineffective watchdog for presidential inability remains to 
this day. 
5. Presidents Can Be Reluctant to Transfer Power Under Section 3 
of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment 
Finally, President Reagan was hesitant to invoke Section 3 of the 
Twenty-Fifth Amendment on several occasions. While the President was 
being taken to the hospital during his assassination attempt, Reagan did not 
invoke Section 3 prior to taking anesthesia, which would have voluntarily 
transferred power to Vice President George H.W. Bush until the President 
recovered.195 Although this was an emergency situation, the President still 
had the time and the mental capacity to invoke this section.196 His aides at 
the hospital, under the belief that the President’s condition was stable, de-
cided not to invoke Section 3 of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment.197 
Additionally, on July 12, 1985, President Reagan had surgery to re-
move a polyp from his colon.198 Before anesthesia was used, President 
Reagan signed a letter to the President Pro Tempore of the Senate and the 
Speaker of the House transferring power to Vice President Bush, making 
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him the Acting President of the United States.199 However, the letter explic-
itly disclaimed using the Twenty-Fifth Amendment.200 Upon recovering 
from the surgery, the President sent another letter to the Speaker and Presi-
dent Pro Tempore explaining that he had resumed the powers of his of-
fice.201 
This episode is particularly perplexing considering that the President 
complied with the formalities of Section 3 of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment 
while expressly denying the use of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment.202 Since 
the Amendment was not explicitly used, it is unclear whether Vice President 
Bush had any legal authority as acting President.203 Reagan’s transfer of 
power, as a matter of policy, was at least a step in the right direction and 
marked an improvement to his prior surgery. 
President George W. Bush did utilize Section 3 of the Twenty-Fifth 
Amendment several times during surgery, making Vice President Dick 
Cheney the Acting President of the United States.204 This is an encouraging 
sign that Section 3 may be utilized more often in the future. 
Based on these historical trends, the protections afforded in Section 3 
and 4 of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment can be inadequate. Presidents often 
conceal their medical issues and their inability from the public.205 They also 
conceal these issues from the Vice President and the cabinet: the very indi-
viduals entrusted under the Twenty-Fifth Amendment to implement the in-
voluntary procedures of Section 4 of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment.206 Even 
worse, when Vice Presidents and the cabinet have learned of presidential 
incapacity, they often neglected their responsibility to temporarily replace 
the President, even in the modern era under the Twenty-Fifth Amend-
ment.207 Additionally, the press is often unable to determine when presiden-
tial inability actually exists. Finally, Presidents may be reluctant to invoke 
Section 3 of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment. 
B. Possible Modifications to the Law 
Due to the current shortcomings of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, 
many commentators and academics have called for various proposals to 
 
 199. Id. 
 200. Id. 
 201. Id. 
 202. Id. 
 203. Id. at 929–30. 
 204. See Feerick, supra note 16, at 931–32; Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Cheney Pens Letter 
While Acting as POTUS, N.Y. TIMES: CAUCUS (Jul. 30, 2007, 5:20 PM), 
https://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2007/07/30/cheney-pens-letter-while-acting-as-potus/. 
 205. See, e.g., FEERICK, supra note 48, at 14–17. 
 206. Id. 
 207. ABRAMS, supra note 176, at 188–89. 
24 UA LITTLE ROCK LAW REVIEW [Vol. 40 
either repeal and replace the amendment or substantially alter the substance 
of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment under the existing legal framework.208 
These proposals, broadly speaking, include constitutional amendments that 
replace the Twenty-Fifth Amendment or legislation that modifies the Twen-
ty-Fifth Amendment. However, as seen below, these proposals have their 
own drawbacks or are unlikely to be implemented. 
1. Constitutional Amendments 
The most direct way to cure the deficiencies of the Twenty-Fifth 
Amendment would be to repeal and replace the amendment.209 For the pur-
poses of this analysis, it is helpful to consider a few alternatives to the 
Twenty-Fifth Amendment that were not enacted into law. One alternative to 
the Twenty-Fifth Amendment was having the Supreme Court, with the as-
sistance of medical experts, determine presidential disability.210 As stated 
above, this method was favored by President Eisenhower.211 This process 
would have begun when Congress, by a concurrent resolution approved by 
two-thirds of each chamber, suggested that the President was unable to dis-
charge the powers of his office.212 If this threshold were met, the Supreme 
Court would then determine whether or not the President was able to dis-
charge the powers of his office.213 If the Court held that the President was 
unable to discharge his duties, the Vice President would become the acting 
President until the next President was elected or until the Supreme Court 
found that the President was able to discharge his duties.214 
As compared to the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, this proposal had the 
advantage of not being dependent upon those close to the President being 
responsible for initiating involuntary removal proceedings against their 
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leader. Additionally, the Supreme Court would presumably serve as a fairly 
neutral and unbiased arbitrator of whether the President was able to dis-
charge his duties. However, this proposal was ultimately rejected because of 
a perceived lack of accountability and for violating the separation of powers 
doctrine.215 
In addition to concerns about lack of accountability and separation of 
powers issues, this proposal is also weak in the sense that members of Con-
gress and the Supreme Court do not have daily interactions with the Presi-
dent. As such, they may not know whether the President is beginning to lose 
his ability to run the country. This is in stark contrast to the Vice President 
and the cabinet who have daily interactions with the President.216 Addition-
ally, because Congress has the ability to initiate this disability proceeding 
under this proposal, there is the risk that this proposal could turn into a tool 
of partisan politics rather than a sacrosanct responsibility. Finally, due to the 
increased partisanship of the Supreme Court, it is debatable how impartial 
the Supreme Court would be if it were required to make a finding of presi-
dential disability.217 As such, this alternative should not be seen as a viable 
alternative to the Twenty-Fifth Amendment. 
A second alternative was the Presidential Inability Commission.218 The 
commission would have been composed of the Vice President of the United 
States, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, the senior Associate Justice 
of the Supreme Court, The Speaker of the House, the minority leader in the 
House, the majority leader in the Senate, the minority leader in the Senate, 
the Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Treasury, and the Attorney Gen-
eral.219 The Vice President would not have voting privileges but would serve 
as the leader of this commission.220 
The commission would be convened if the President stated he was un-
able to discharge his duties or if three members of the commission believed 
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that the President was unable to fulfill his duties.221 Once convened, the 
commission would seek medical advice on the condition of the President.222 
If a majority of the commission found that the President could not discharge 
his duties, the Vice President would become acting President until the next 
President was elected or until the commission found that the disability had 
been removed.223 
This proposal had the advantage of a broad group of elected leaders, 
which would provide for some accountability to the people, justices who 
should serve as detached observers of inability, and insiders of the executive 
branch presumably loyal to the President.224 Moreover, because the Vice 
President could not vote, any vote by the commission would hopefully have 
the appearance of being a neutral finding of fact rather than a Machiavellian 
takeover.225 Additionally, because of the specific requirement that the com-
mission consult medical experts, any finding of fact by the commission 
should be based, in part, on actual medical experts.226 
However, some obvious drawbacks are that three members could easily 
convene this commission.227 When two of the members will be a senator and 
a congressman from the opposite party of the President, it is easy to imagine 
that political mischief could occur. Furthermore, the most serious drawback 
is that the President of the United States, who is the only elected official 
representing the entire country and who receives millions of votes nation-
wide, could have his power taken away by five votes of a Presidential Ina-
bility Commission. Thus, this proposed amendment should not be used as a 
model. 
Finally, any proposed constitutional amendment, no matter the merits 
of the proposal, would face significant procedural, political, and enthusiasm 
barriers. On the procedural side, constitutional amendments are very diffi-
cult to enact because, absent a state convention, they require a two-thirds 
vote in both chambers of Congress and ratification by three-fourths of the 
state legislatures.228 By implication, any amendment seeking to modify or 
replace the Twenty-Fifth Amendment would face these procedural barri-
ers.229 If reform were sought, Republicans would have a particular advantage 
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because of their current strength at the state level and their majorities in both 
chambers of Congress.230 
Moreover, any amendment would face significant political barriers. 
When reform was attempted in the past, both political parties were highly 
suspicious of the motivations of the other party, such as when Democrats 
rejected President Eisenhower’s proposals out of fear that this was a ploy to 
make Nixon the President before an election.231 Thus, in this highly partisan 
age, any constitutional amendment seeking to reform or replace the Twenty-
Fifth Amendment would be viewed through the prism of presidential poli-
tics regardless of the merits of the proposal.232 Any reform offered by Dem-
ocrats would essentially be dead on arrival due to their potential motive to 
weaken President Trump and their current weakness at the state and federal 
level.233 Republicans, however, would have an easier time passing reform 
and lack an obvious political motivation for doing so.234 
Finally, any amendment would face a significant enthusiasm gap. The 
Twenty-Fifth Amendment was only passed after President Kennedy was 
assassinated and the remaining line of succession was very vulnerable.235 
Previous efforts at reform usually ended once a new President was elected 
and public memory of the prior President’s disability faded.236 Although the 
election of Donald J. Trump has revised some interest in the Twenty-Fifth 
Amendment, this interest is still lacking nationwide consensus to sustain 
serious constitutional reforms. Likewise, due to the Democratic Party’s 
weakness at the state level, and minority status in both chambers of Con-
gress, any zeal by the Democratic Party is currently irrelevant barring an 
unforeseen development.237 If reform is to be had, it almost certainly will not 
take the form of a constitutional amendment and will require Republican 
support. 
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2. Other Body as Congress by Law May Provide 
The Twenty-Fifth Amendment allows for the Vice President and “a 
majority of either the principal offices of the executive departments or of 
such other body as Congress may by law provide” to determine whether the 
President is unable to discharge his duties.238 Congress’ power to create an-
other body is vast: “it can designate itself, expand or restrict the membership 
of the cabinet, combine the cabinet with other officials, and prescribe the 
rules and procedures to be followed by that body.”239 Due to the hardships in 
changing the Constitution, it is much more likely that any reform will be 
done via congressional legislation pursuant to the Twenty-Fifth Amendment 
rather than a new constitutional amendment.240 Below are some of the other 
bodies that Congress could create. This section will ultimately conclude that 
an advisory panel of medical experts is the most efficient and responsible 
way to improve the protections of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment. 
a. Panel of congressional leaders to decide inability 
Congress could use its powers enumerated in the Twenty-Fifth 
Amendment to create a panel of congressional leaders, in conjunction with 
the Vice President, to make the initial finding of presidential inability.241 On 
the surface, this proposal has significant advantages. First, a panel of con-
gressional leaders, who are elected by the people, would be independent of 
the President’s authority. These congressional leaders would therefore dis-
play more independence than cabinet officials who can be fired by the Pres-
ident without cause. As an example, consider when President Wilson fired 
Secretary of State Lansing for his perceived disloyalty by calling cabinet 
meetings while the President was disabled.242 Additionally, because con-
gressional leaders are elected by the American people and are responsible to 
them, this panel would be more responsible to and representative of the peo-
ple’s wishes. This is in stark contrast to a panel of federal judges or a panel 
composed of medical experts deciding whether the President is disabled. 
Congress could also impose a two-thirds requirement for the panel to make 
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a finding of inability, which should prevent a slim majority of congressional 
leaders from illicitly harming the President. 
There is also precedent for Congress to serve as the judge of a Presi-
dent’s ability to serve. For example, the House of Representatives has the 
power of bringing impeachment proceedings by a majority vote against the 
President for treason, bribery, and other serious crimes and misdemean-
ors.243 The proceeding then moves to the Senate for trial.244 If the Senate 
votes by a two-thirds margin to convict, the President can be removed from 
office.245 Likewise, under the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, Congress serves as 
the final arbitrator of deciding if the President is fit to serve when the Presi-
dent contests a finding that he is unable to discharge the powers of his of-
fice.246 Because Congress may have to ultimately decide whether or not the 
President is disabled,247 having a panel of congressional leaders with the 
power to initiate proceedings under the Twenty-Fifth Amendment seems 
logical. 
Despite this, Congress should not designate a panel of congressional 
leaders to make the initial determination of presidential inability. First, a 
member of Congress who is a member of the disability panel may use that 
position to threaten the President or may use that position as leverage during 
other negotiations. Second, there is a significant concern that during a divid-
ed government, when the President and the majorities of Congress are from 
differing political parties, a hostile Congress could use the commission for 
inappropriate reasons. This risk of politicized investigations during divided 
government was highlighted by Douglas Kriner and Liam Schwartz who 
found that: 
Since the end of World War II, partisanship has played a key role (in 
driving congressional investigations). Under divided government, high-
profile oversight activity grows more frequent and intense. In unified 
government, investigatory activity wanes, particularly when a cohesive 
congressional majority is in place to defend its partisan ally in the White 
House and the integrity of the shared party label.248 
If Congress were given the power to initiate disability proceedings, 
partisanship would play a key role as it has in the past for similar proceed-
ings.249 This would be especially true given the current visceral anger con-
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gressional Democrats have towards President Trump. Third, although Con-
gress already has the impeachment power, they have not always used that 
power responsibly.250 For example, during the impeachment of President 
Bill Clinton, many academics and commentators believed that his impeach-
ment was politically motivated rather than constitutionally justified.251 As 
such, it is debatable whether we should entrust more quasi-judicial power to 
the legislative branch. Finally, from a practical standpoint, a panel of con-
gressional leaders would lack daily contact with the President and therefore 
may not detect subtle changes in cognitive function or see isolated events of 
incapacity. This is in contrast to the cabinet that often works with the Presi-
dent on a daily basis. Thus, a panel of congressional leaders should not be 
entrusted to initiate disability proceedings against the President. 
b. Panel of federal judges to determine presidential inability 
Similar to the idea originally proposed by President Eisenhower, Con-
gress could create a panel of federal judges to determine presidential inabil-
ity.252 This panel could be composed of various federal judges, from the dis-
trict courts all the way to Supreme Court, selected at random for a set period 
of time. To avoid the appearances of partisanship, the panel should be divid-
ed evenly between judges selected by Republican Presidents and Democrat-
ic Presidents. Congress should require that any finding of inability be sup-
ported by a two-thirds majority and should also provide for medical experts 
to advise the panel. This panel could then schedule meetings with the Presi-
dent on a regular basis or when they suspect that the President is unable to 
discharge the duties of his office. 
A panel of federal judges, who serve for life terms, would have the ad-
vantage of being completely independent from the President. As such, they 
would be much more independent than a panel of cabinet members who are 
subordinate to the President and can be fired without cause. Also, unlike 
congressional members, federal judges who are serving life terms should be 
less interested in using the panel for short-term political purposes. Federal 
judges, because of their job, would also be more qualified to listen to expert 
testimony, hear all of the factual evidence, and make a detached decision 
based on all the facts. Lastly, as compared to a panel of medical experts who 
determine presidential inability, federal judges are at least confirmed by the 
Senate, which provides for some oversight. 
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Although a panel of federal judges determining inability would certain-
ly be preferable to a panel of congressional leaders, this option still should 
not be used. First, although federal judges are selected by the President and 
confirmed by the Senate, they still lack direct accountability to the Ameri-
can people at large. As such, because the people would have no direct re-
course against a panel of rogue judges, this option is particularly troubling. 
Second, although judges are certainly less political than congressional lead-
ers, personal and political conflicts still arise between the executive and ju-
dicial branch, which is especially true during the current administration.253 
Third, questions of presidential inability will almost always be mixed with 
issues of national security and political questions: two areas where courts 
are highly deferential.254 As such, a panel of federal judges would not be the 
best reform. 
c. Panel of federal judges, congressional leaders, and cabinet 
officials 
As noted above, an early alternative to the Twenty-Fifth Amendment 
was to have a disability commission composed of Justices of the Supreme 
Court, key congressional leaders, and cabinet officials to determine whether 
presidential inability existed.255 Likewise, Congress could create an “other 
body” similar to this early proposal.256 One advantage of this commission 
would be the mixture of individuals serving on the commission: federal 
judges, who should serve as detached observers; congressional leaders who 
represent the people; and cabinet officials who are presumably loyal to the 
President. Congress could impose a two-thirds majority requirement to pre-
vent slim majorities or partisan interests from illicitly harming the President. 
This balance of interests would be much more preferable to a panel 
composed entirely of congressional leaders. As mentioned earlier, because 
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the judges and congressional leaders are independent of the President, they 
would not fear reprisals from the President. At the same time, by having 
cabinet officials serve on the committee, the President’s legitimate interests 
would be protected as well. However, because congressional leaders would 
be on the panel, politics would always be a factor.257 Likewise, due to the 
implicit partisanship of the Supreme Court, it is possible that politics could 
play a role as well even if Justices served on the commission.258 As such, 
although this commission merits serious attention, it does not represent the 
optimal method of reforming the Twenty-Fifth Amendment. 
d. Panel of citizens to determine presidential inability 
A previously unconsidered proposal in determining presidential inabil-
ity would be for Congress to establish a panel of citizens, in conjunction 
with the Vice President, to determine whether presidential inability exists. 
This panel could be a representative cross-section of the nation. The panel 
could also be sworn to secrecy, similar to a grand jury, so that any proceed-
ings before it are confidential. If this panel receives information that the 
President may be disabled, they could send a request to examine the Presi-
dent or invoke Section 4 of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment. Likewise, the 
Vice President could bring information before this panel to initiate Section 4 
of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment. Congress could also impose super-
majority requirements so that any finding of disability would require a two-
thirds majority. Congress could also supply this panel with medical experts 
of various backgrounds to help them in their determination of presidential 
inability. 
This novel way of determining presidential inability has some unique 
merits. First, so long as the panel was representative of the nation at large, it 
would represent the people of the United States and could be seen as a truly 
democratic institution. This is in contrast to a panel of medical experts or 
Supreme Court Justices determining presidential inability.259 Likewise, be-
cause this would be a group of citizens rather than officials from other 
branches of the government, there would not be a separation of powers con-
cern.260 Additionally, panels of citizens, like the grand jury, have historically 
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been seen as a check against government misconduct.261 As such, this panel 
could be seen as a check on government misconduct both from the stand-
point of Presidents who conceal their disabilities and other government offi-
cials who would cover up those disabilities. Finally, juries are seen as valu-
able in deciding contested facts and legitimizing the outcomes of controver-
sial subjects.262 Thus, a panel of citizens could likewise be seen as a valuable 
way of determining presidential disability and offering legitimacy to that 
controversial decision. 
However, this proposal would have serious drawbacks. First, there 
would always be the chance that a rogue panel of citizens is trying to inves-
tigate the President not because there is a serious allegation or evidence of 
presidential inability, but because they dislike the President (this would be 
especially true if the President was very unpopular).263 Second, although 
grand juries have historically been seen as a check on prosecutorial miscon-
duct, this is largely not true today.264 It is questionable how effective this 
citizen panel would be in preventing government misconduct during presi-
dential inability. Third, although a panel of citizens would have the benefit 
of being representative of the people, they would not have a significant un-
derstanding of the workings of the executive branch. Unlike the cabinet, 
they could not adequately weigh the political and policy consequences of 
their action. Finally, and most importantly, a panel of citizens could fall 
victim to a charismatic and Machiavellian Vice President who uses the panel 
as a way to remove a President purely for his own political gain.265 The cab-
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inet, however, would presumably be more loyal to the President and more 
cautious. Although a novel idea, a panel of citizens to determine presidential 
inability should be rejected. 
e. Panel of former Presidents and Vice Presidents to determine 
presidential disability 
An interesting suggestion by Congressman Earl Blumenauer would be 
for Congress to create an “other body” composed primarily of former Presi-
dents and Vice Presidents to determine presidential disability.266 The con-
gressman justifies his proposal with the understanding that this “group of 
people understands the pressures of the office and what’s necessary to dis-
charge the responsibilities (of the presidency). Further, they all won national 
elections and were tested by actually discharging the responsibilities (of the 
office).”267 
Congressman Blumenauer’s proposal has some significant strengths. 
First, former Presidents and Vice Presidents do understand the pressures of 
the office and the requisite strength required to meet them. As such, a panel 
of former Presidents and Vice Presidents would be the most qualified group 
of individuals to judge whether a current President is fit to serve. Second, 
the congressman is correct in saying that former Presidents, who were elect-
ed by the people, would have greater persuasive authority and more appar-
ent legitimacy than a panel of unknown medical experts or relatively un-
known political leaders. Third, because this panel would be composed of 
former members of the executive branch, there is not a separation of powers 
concern that arises when congressional leaders or judges determine whether 
the President is incapacitated. 
However, this proposal has the inherent weakness that former Presi-
dents may have personal and political grudges against the current President. 
For example, consider the living Presidents we currently have: Jimmy 
Carter, George H.W. Bush, Bill Clinton, George W. Bush, and Barrack 
Obama.268 This group of individuals has significant conflicts with President 
Trump. Former President Bill Clinton could be very biased against President 
Trump because Trump just defeated his wife in a bitter presidential elec-
tion.269 Likewise, former President Obama could be very biased considering 
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the personal animosity between him and the current President and the fact 
that he was a strong supporter of the defeated Hillary Clinton.270 Additional-
ly, both former President George H.W. Bush and George W. Bush could be 
biased against Trump because Trump routed Jeb Bush in the Republican 
Primary.271 This would essentially leave Jimmy Carter, a Democrat who is 
92 years old, as the only former President without a direct personal conflict 
with President Trump.272 Under Congressman Blumenauer’s proposal, how-
ever, these former Presidents with significant conflicts of interest would 
help determine whether President Donald J. Trump is fit for office, or they 
would have to recuse themselves. Additionally, although the most recent 
election was especially contentious and filled with dynastic implications, we 
should expect similar conflicts of interest to occur in the future. As such, 
there are significant concerns about having a panel of former Vice Presi-
dents and former Presidents deciding whether the current President is able to 
discharge the powers of his office. 
Despite the fact that political and personal disputes between the current 
President and former Presidents could often arise under this proposal, it is 
possible that these concerns could be manageable. For example, former 
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Presidents often transcend traditional politics and serve as elder statesmen of 
the nation rather than as advocates of their political party.273 As such, a panel 
of former Presidents could very well put aside partisan considerations when 
determining whether the current President is incapacitated. Likewise, former 
Presidents who had personal disputes with each other often become amica-
ble once their tenure is over. Recent examples include the friendship be-
tween George W. Bush and former First Lady Michelle Obama, the friend-
ship between Bill Clinton and George H.W. Bush, and the friendship be-
tween Jimmy Carter and Gerald Ford.274 As such, it is entirely possible that a 
panel of former chief executives would put aside any personal disputes and 
fairly examine the situation. 
All things considered, Congressman Blumenauer’s proposal has signif-
icant advantages and some potentially serious drawbacks. A panel of former 
Presidents would have unique insight on whether a current President has the 
ability to meet the demands of the office. However, there will always be a 
concern about political and personal disputes between former and current 
Presidents. Accordingly, although this proposal demands serious considera-
tion, other solutions are preferable. 
f. Panel of medical experts to determine presidential disability 
Another alternative to the current system would be for Congress to cre-
ate a panel of medical experts from various backgrounds and specialties to 
regularly meet with the President and determine with the Vice President, 
rather than the cabinet, if the President is suffering from any incapacitating 
conditions.275 An obvious advantage of this system is that these experts 
would be more likely to diagnose or recognize debilitating conditions than 
cabinet officials who usually lack specialized medical training.276 Moreover, 
because this would be an independent body created by Congress, this group 
of experts would be more aggressive than cabinet members who can be uni-
laterally fired by the President.277 
 
 273. See Kenneth T. Walsh, Bush and Ex-Presidents Counsel President-Elect Obama, 
U.S. NEWS (Jan. 8, 2009), https://www.usnews.com/news/obama/articles/2009/01/08/bush-
and-ex-presidents-counsel-president-elect-obama. 
 274. Deena Zaru, George W. Bush Explains His Fondness for Michelle Obama, CNN 
(Mar. 3, 2017), http://www.cnn.com/2017/03/02/politics/george-bush-michelle-obama-
friends/; Kevin Bahn, George H.W. Bush on Bonding with Bill Clinton, CNN (Mar. 5, 2013), 
http://politicalticker.blogs.cnn.com/2013/03/05/george-h-w-bush-on-bonding-with-bill-
clinton/; Ford and Carter: An Odd Couple?, CBS (Feb. 18, 2000), http://www.cbsnews.com/
news/ford-and-carter-an-odd-couple/. 
 275. See, e.g., Edwin M. Yoder Jr., Determining Presidential Health Under the Twenty-
Fifth Amendment, 30 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 607, 613–14 (1995). 
 276. See id. 
 277. Id. 
2017] CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 37 
Nonetheless, there are major drawbacks to this alternative. First, a 
commission of medical experts lacks accountability to the American people 
at large, even if Congress appoints them. Moreover, the medical field is not 
representative of the people of the United States in general.278 This is in con-
trast to the President who is the only elected official who represents the en-
tire United States and receives millions of votes nationwide.279 Thus, it is 
inappropriate for a small body of unelected, unrepresentative, and unac-
countable experts to have the ability to sideline the President of the United 
States, even if they have better qualifications and are more independent than 
the cabinet. 
Second, although a panel of medical experts would have more clinical 
training in recognizing signs of inability, it is unclear how often they would 
meet with the President.280 This is in contrast to the cabinet, which has fre-
quent meetings and interactions with the President as a part of their daily 
routine. Thus, the cabinet is in a better position to see subtle changes or iso-
lated incidents of incapacity than a panel of experts who infrequently meet 
with the President. 
Finally, the decision on whether to invoke the involuntary protections 
of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment is not a purely medical decision because 
the decision cannot be separated from considerations of national security, 
international diplomacy, and other issues of significance.281 Thus, the cabi-
net, with a large coalition of generalists from various areas of experience 
and expertise, would be in a better position to weigh these concerns than a 
panel of medical experts.282 As such, the idea of a panel of medical experts 
determining presidential disability should be firmly rejected. 
g. Advisory panel of medical experts 
A proposal by Dr. Bert E. Park is to have a panel of physicians, spe-
cializing in various areas of medicine, be selected by the President prior to 
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the start of his administration.283 This panel, however, would be advisory 
only and could not invoke Section 4 of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment.284 
Rather, they would only give advice to the Vice President and the cabinet 
pertaining to whether the President is able to discharge his duties based off 
their examination of him.285 
An advisory medical panel would have significant advantages over a 
medical panel with the role of determining presidential inability. First, be-
cause they would lack the ability to actually remove the President, the con-
cern of a small body of unelected doctors removing the President is elimi-
nated. Second, because the cabinet would still be in charge of deciding 
whether the President is disabled, they would still be able to weigh the other 
policy ramifications of their decision as opposed to making a purely medical 
decision. 
This proposal would also be preferable to a panel composed purely of 
congressional leaders.286 As noted earlier, a panel of congressional leaders 
would be subject to unnecessary political factors during periods of divided 
government. This would not be the case under an advisory panel of medical 
experts because the cabinet, which is loyal to the President, would still be 
responsible for making the preliminary finding of inability. 
An advisory panel of medical experts, as a matter of practicality, is also 
more likely to be implemented as compared to a panel composed of federal 
judges, cabinet officials, and congressional leaders. This is because the latter 
panel would represent a fundamental shift in the use of the Twenty-Fifth 
Amendment, and therefore would face political, structural, and enthusiasm 
issues. These same concerns would also apply to a panel composed of for-
mer Presidents and Vice Presidents. The advisory panel of medical experts, 
by contrast, is simply tweaking the existing framework by giving the cabi-
net, which still decides whether inability exists, expert advice. This minor 
change of the current system would be less controversial, and therefore has a 
greater likelihood of success. 
Finally, an advisory panel of medical experts would significantly im-
prove the current system. First, with an advisory panel of experts, the cabi-
net and the Vice President would have expert analysis of medical and physi-
ological issues when making any determination of presidential inability. 
Second, because the panel is empowered by Congress, the panel would be 
independent of the President and could encourage the cabinet to act when 
necessary. As such, Congress should establish an advisory panel of medical 
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experts to assist the cabinet with their responsibilities under the Twenty-
Fifth Amendment. 
3. Creation of a New Cabinet Position 
Under the existing legal framework of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, 
the cabinet and the Vice President are entrusted to determine presidential 
inability.287 There is no requirement for the cabinet to consult with outside 
medical experts.288 However, Congress has the power to create new cabinet 
positions.289 For example, after the attacks on the World Trade Center on 
September 11th, 2001, Congress passed the Homeland Security Act, which 
created the cabinet position of the Secretary of Homeland Security.290 There-
fore, Congress, with the consent of the President, could create a new cabinet 
position with the responsibility to detect presidential inability.291 This new 
cabinet position could be a medical expert who could provide clinical advice 
to his or her fellow cabinet members. 
a. Elevation of the White House physician to a cabinet level po-
sition 
A popular proposal is to make the White House physician a cabinet of-
fice.292 Under this proposal, the President would select a physician to serve 
as his personal physician.293 This selection, however, would then be subject 
to congressional approval as it would be a cabinet level position.294 This 
approval process would ensure that the physician is qualified and that the 
physician is also aware of his or her dual role of detecting presidential ina-
bility.295 Moreover, if the Vice President and cabinet ever had to decide 
whether or not the President was unable to discharge his duties, the cabinet 
would have a medical expert who has personal knowledge of the President’s 
health. 
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Nonetheless, a glaring shortcoming with this proposal is physician eth-
ics and confidentiality laws.296 Simply put, it would be difficult for a physi-
cian to be treating the President as a doctor and then be expected to use or 
disclose that information in determination of whether the President is fit for 
service.297 Likewise, because of this potential dual role, it is likely that Pres-
idents would seek outside medical care so as not to alert the cabinet of a 
potentially disqualifying medical diagnosis.298 
Additionally, from a historical perspective, the White House physician 
was often complicit in the cover up of presidential inability because of per-
sonal loyalty to the President.299 It is uncertain whether entrusting the White 
House physician to implement Section 4 of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment is 
realistic. As a related concern, the President can always fire his cabinet offi-
cials with or without cause. Accordingly, the White House physician, like 
other members of the cabinet, may be hesitant to invoke Section 4 of the 
Twenty-Fifth Amendment out of fear of being fired. Because of these con-
siderations, it is not advisable to elevate the White House physician to a 
cabinet level position. Rather, the White House physician and President 
should retain a more traditional doctor-patient relationship. 
b. Creation of a new cabinet position to help determine presi-
dential disability 
A related approach would be for Congress to create a new cabinet posi-
tion filled by someone with medical expertise with the responsibility to 
monitor the President’s health.300 This position could offer medical expertise 
to his or her fellow cabinet members if issues of inability arose and could 
alert the cabinet or the Vice President if he or she suspected presidential 
inability. Because this position would be created with the responsibility to 
monitor the President’s health, this should prevent this cabinet member from 
turning a blind eye to medical issues. Also, because this new position would 
only be one vote among many cabinet members, there wouldn’t be the same 
concerns about medical experts having disproportionate influence over the 
executive branch. 
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Nonetheless, an advisory panel of medical experts would still be pref-
erable to a new cabinet position. First, as a matter of practicality, it would be 
much easier for Congress to exercise its power under the Twenty-Fifth 
Amendment to create an advisory panel of experts rather than create a new 
cabinet post for a medical expert. Second, an advisory panel of medical ex-
perts could be composed of a broad group of physicians with various medi-
cal expertise and backgrounds. This would be preferable to appointing one 
medical expert to a cabinet position who would have a more limited per-
spective overall. Finally, an advisory panel of medical experts created pur-
suant to the Twenty-Fifth Amendment could not be removed unilaterally by 
the President. This is in stark contrast to a cabinet member who can be fired 
without cause by the President. As such, an advisory panel of medical ex-
perts created under the Twenty-Fifth Amendment is a much better solution 
than creating a new cabinet position. 
C. Reform Outside of the Legal System 
Prolonged periods of presidential inability can also be prevented with-
out changing existing law. Broadly speaking, this would include making 
presidential inability and the Twenty-Fifth Amendment an explicit part of 
presidential campaigns and senate confirmation hearings of prospective cab-
inet officials. Likewise, the executive branch could adopt voluntary agree-
ments to supplement the Twenty-Fifth Amendment. These solutions are 
discussed below. 
1. Greater Emphasis on the Twenty-Fifth Amendment during Presi-
dential Campaigns 
During the 2016 Presidential Campaign, the health of the major candi-
dates was a frequent topic of discussion.301 Due to their advanced ages, the 
press often discussed the health of Bernie Sanders, Hillary Clinton, and 
Donald Trump.302 However, this discussion did not translate into more seri-
ous discussions about the Twenty-Fifth Amendment and presidential disa-
bility until Donald Trump was elected President. For example, despite Hilla-
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ry Clinton’s extensive medical history and advanced age, early criticisms of 
her health and fitness for office were dismissed as sexist.303 This narrative 
changed when she was diagnosed with pneumonia, a diagnosis that she ini-
tially concealed from the public, and then collapsed on camera, possibly 
losing consciousness, on September 11, 2016.304 Clinton was then taken to 
her daughter’s apartment and examined by her doctor at her home in Chap-
paqua, New York, rather than visiting a hospital.305 Such actions on behalf 
of Clinton should have raised serious discussions on the Twenty-Fifth 
Amendment and parallels to the Wilson administration. Likewise, although 
questions about Trump’s health were raised during the campaign, serious 
discussions about the ramifications and applications of the Twenty-Fifth 
Amendment were not raised until after he won the election, creating the 
appearance of partisanship.306 
For example, during all three presidential debates, the Twenty-Fifth 
Amendment was never mentioned.307 Considering the health issues of both 
candidates, and their advanced ages, a perfectly acceptable question would 
have been to inquire about under what circumstances would a President 
Clinton or a President Trump invoke Section 3 of the Twenty-Fifth 
Amendment. Another legitimate question would be what, if any, instructions 
would a President Clinton or a President Trump give to their Vice President 
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and cabinet regarding when, if ever, they should invoke Section 4 of the 
Twenty-Fifth Amendment against them. 
Even more egregious, during the debate between vice presidential can-
didates Mike Pence and Tim Kaine, the Twenty-Fifth Amendment was nev-
er mentioned.308 This would have been an exceptional opportunity to ask 
both candidates about how they would deal with presidential incapacity, 
when and under what circumstances would they consider invoking Section 4 
of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, and would they be ready to assume the 
powers of Acting President of the United States if either Section 3 or Sec-
tion 4 of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment were invoked. Lastly, and most im-
portantly, the vice presidential candidates should have been asked about 
how they would handle the nightmare scenario where a majority of the cabi-
net and the Vice President believe the President is unable to discharge his or 
her duties but the President contests their view. 
In sum, although the health of both candidates was discussed during the 
election cycle, there was not a serious discussion by the press with the can-
didates or their running mates about presidential disability and the Twenty-
Fifth Amendment. The time for an objective inquiry into the Twenty-Fifth 
Amendment should occur during the election when concessions can be 
made from candidates and their running mates. The current calls to use or 
alter the Twenty-Fifth Amendment after Donald Trump won the election are 
largely partisan based rather than legitimately motivated by a desire for con-
stitutional reform.309 This should serve as a lesson for future election cycles. 
2. Senate Confirmation Hearings 
Likewise, Senate confirmation hearings of the prospective cabinet offi-
cials serve as an excellent way to probe nominees about their thoughts on 
the Twenty-Fifth Amendment. This is especially important because the most 
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important decision a cabinet member may ever make could be a decision to 
invoke Section 4 of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment. Cabinet nominees should 
be asked how they would respond to a situation where the President was 
displaying serious signs of inability, under what situations would they con-
sider invoking Section 4 of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, and how they 
would respond if a President, after being found unable to discharge his duty 
by the Vice President and a majority of the cabinet, contested their decision 
and tried to reclaim the powers of his office. Additionally, cabinet positions 
with special legal obligations, such as the Attorney General, or candidates 
with medical expertise should be asked additional questions regarding their 
unique responsibility regarding the Twenty-Fifth Amendment. 
Nonetheless, during the confirmation hearing of Dr. Ben Carson, the 
issue of presidential disability or the Twenty-Fifth Amendment was never 
mentioned.310 This is especially dismaying because Dr. Carson is a neurolo-
gist and a medical doctor and, due to this background, would be invaluable 
if Section 4 of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment were ever invoked, or needed 
to be invoked. Likewise, Jeff Sessions was never asked about the Twenty-
Fifth Amendment despite the fact that, as Attorney General of the United 
States, he would have a unique responsibility in advising the President, the 
Vice President, the cabinet, and the rest of the administration about Section 
3 and Section 4 of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment.311 This trend of not dis-
cussing presidential disability or the Twenty-Fifth Amendment continued 
for the rest of President Trump’s cabinet nominees.312 
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As a practical concern, it may be difficult to get substantive answers 
from cabinet nominees about how they would handle presidential inability. 
For example, judicial nominees often demur on legal questions in Senate 
confirmation hearings because they believe that answering those questions 
will undercut their appearance of impartiality. Likewise, cabinet nominees 
may offer similar justifications for not answering how they would handle 
presidential inability. Despite this concern, the act of bringing up presiden-
tial inability and the Twenty-Fifth Amendment during Senate confirmation 
hearings would still impress upon cabinet nominees their constitutional re-
sponsibilities and remind them of their duty under the Twenty-Fifth 
Amendment. Senators should openly question cabinet nominees about their 
views of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment and presidential inability during 
confirmation hearings. 
3. Establishment of Guidelines and Agreements in the Executive 
Branch 
Lastly, Presidents and their administrations should create guidelines 
and agreements to supplement the Twenty-Fifth Amendment.313 The Presi-
dent should discuss situations where he would wish to invoke Section 3 of 
the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, such as when he would undergo anesthesia, 
and those agreements should be prepared in advance so that they could be 
signed at a moment’s notice during stressful situations.314 This would be 
especially important in a situation where the President had been shot and 
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was quickly being transported to the hospital. Such a prepackaged agree-
ment could then be quickly signed by the President before he undergoes 
anesthesia or otherwise becomes incapacitated. 
Likewise, at the start of his administration, a President should discuss 
potential situations where he would wish that Section 4 of the Twenty-Fifth 
Amendment be invoked against him.315 These situations could include typi-
cal situations, such as losing consciousness for a prolonged period of time or 
being diagnosed with a severe mental disease; to more complicated situa-
tions such as if the President has fallen into the hands of the enemy. Like-
wise, Presidents should decide on key terms, definitions, and the general 
intent of these instructions. 
These contingency plans should then be signed by the President, the 
Vice President, the cabinet, and witnessed by detached observers. These 
instructions should then be made available for public viewing if the Twenty-
Fifth Amendment were ever utilized. Although these agreements would not 
have the force of law, they would provide highly persuasive authority of 
what the cabinet and Vice President should do during periods of incapacity. 
Moreover, such voluntary agreements have yielded success in the past. 
These agreements would hopefully provide enough encouragement to avoid 
disasters like those in the past where the cabinet or the Vice President was 
complacent. 
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The Twenty-Fifth Amendment can be improved within the existing le-
gal framework with relatively minimal effort. These reforms include (1) the 
adoption of voluntary agreements within the executive branch to give mean-
ing to the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, (2) the creation of an advisory panel of 
medical experts to advise the Vice President and the cabinet on whether 
presidential disability exists, and (3) greater emphasis on presidential inca-
pacity throughout the political process. 
A. Voluntary Agreements within the Executive Branch 
The Trump administration, as well as future administrations, should 
adopt various voluntary agreements to give meaning and context to the 
Twenty-Fifth Amendment. President Trump and his advisors should consid-
er specific situations where the President would want to transfer power vol-
untarily, such as when undergoing surgery, and have those agreements made 
 
   315.  See Birch Bayh, The Twenty-Fifth Amendment: Dealing With Presidential Disabil-
ity, 30 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 437, 449-450 (1995). 
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pursuant to the language of Section 3 of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment.316 
These agreements should then be kept close to the President at all times so 
they can be signed at a moment’s notice in the event of an emergency. 
More importantly, President Trump and future Presidents should de-
cide under what situations they would want Section 4 of the Twenty-Fifth 
Amendment invoked against them.317 These situations could include a broad 
range of situations such as the President being diagnosed with a degenera-
tive mental illness or the President falling into the hands of the enemy.318 
The President, in conjunction with his physician and attorneys, should also 
consider drafting and defining key terms and the general intent of these in-
structions.319 Such voluntary instructions, although they would not have the 
force of law, could help prevent prolonged periods of incapacity. 
B. An Advisory Panel of Medical Experts 
Pursuant to the Twenty-Fifth Amendment and existing law, Congress 
should establish an advisory panel of medical experts. This panel should be 
advisory only and should not be able to invoke Section 4 of the Twenty-
Fifth Amendment.320 Rather, this panel should only be able to advise the 
Vice President and the cabinet on whether the President is incapacitated and 
give other medical advice. 
This middle ground approach at reform is optimal because it does not 
place undue importance on medical experts, which would occur if Congress 
created a special commission of medical experts to decide whether presiden-
tial inability existed. This advisory panel also does not represent a signifi-
cant separation of powers concern, which would occur if Congress created a 
panel composed of federal judges and congressional leaders, and the adviso-
ry panel has the advantage of being independent from the President. Finally, 
from a practicality standpoint, this reform is much more likely to gain the 
requisite support to be enacted into law as compared to other proposed re-
forms. 
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C. Greater Political Scrutiny  
Finally, more emphasis needs to be placed on presidential inability and 
the Twenty-Fifth Amendment throughout the political process. First, the 
press must always be alert to who is in control of the executive branch and 
whether the President is suffering from any legitimate, debilitating condi-
tions. Second, during the election season, journalists need to question presi-
dential candidates about when they would consider invoking Section 3 of 
the Twenty-Fifth Amendment and when they would wish that Section 4 of 
the Twenty-Fifth Amendment be invoked against them. Likewise, the press 
should ask vice presidential candidates under what situations they would 
invoke Section 4 of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment and how they would re-
spond to a President who contested their finding that an inability existed. 
Finally, during senate confirmation hearings of cabinet nominees, the Senate 
must impress upon cabinet nominees of their duties under the Twenty-Fifth 
Amendment and ask them under what situations the nominee would consid-
er invoking Section 4 of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment. 
V. CONCLUSION 
History shows that Vice Presidents and cabinet officials often lack the 
will or the ability to effectively check a President who has become incapaci-
tated. Additionally, Presidents have historically held onto power despite the 
fact that they were incapacitated, in rapidly declining health, or disabled. 
This causes great concern because the current framework of the Twenty-
Fifth Amendment is premised on the ability of the Vice President and mem-
bers of the cabinet to remove an incapacitated President under Section 4 of 
the Twenty-Fifth Amendment or for the President to voluntarily transfer his 
power under Section 3 of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment to the Vice Presi-
dent before he becomes incapacitated. 
However, despite the shortcomings of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, it 
still represents the most effective way to manage presidential disability be-
cause the cabinet and the Vice President are in the best position to observe 
the President, these individuals know the responsibilities of the executive 
branch, and these individuals, collectively, are not predisposed to use the 
Twenty-Fifth Amendment for improper reasons. 
Likewise, the Twenty-Fifth Amendment still allows for the possibility 
of reform. This reform should include (1) establishing an advisory panel of 
medical experts to assist the cabinet in determining whether the President is 
incapacitated and (2) establishing voluntary agreements within the executive 
branch to give meaning and context to the protections of the Twenty-Fifth 
Amendment. Furthermore, having legitimate discussions about presidential 
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inability throughout the political process will strengthen the protections of 
the Twenty-Fifth Amendment. 
Taken together, these reforms within the existing constitutional frame-
work will help prevent presidential disability, which is of paramount im-
portance in the modern era. Further, these improvements are realistically 
achievable in the current political environment. Therefore, congressional 
leaders and the Trump administration should evaluate and adopt these pro-
posed reforms. 
 
